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Abstract
The newly-established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has aroused
public attention and comments in the whole 2014. However, researchers and
economists have never reached the consensus on the economic impact of AIIB on
Asian developing countries. The thesis aims to find out the potential role of AIIB in
promoting economic growth in Asian developing countries through empirical research
and its potential limitations and challenges that might occur in its later development
path. The thesis emphasizes on the five countries with highest demand for aid which
nearly account for 90% of the whole demand in Asia in infrastructure and observes
the long run relationship between infrastructure development, official development
aid (ODA) and economic growth through historical data of the macroeconomics
variables in five countries in past two decades. In the research, autoregressive
distributed lagged (ARDL) approach to cointegration is applied to help find out the
long run coefficients between interested variables. Also, Granger causality test is
employed to determine the causality between infrastructure development and
economic growth.
The empirical results imply that AIIB has a potentially positive role in promoting
economic growth in Asian developing countries because at least one interested
variable, namely, infrastructure development or ODA, has significant long-run
relationship with economic growth in five countries. Based on the findings,
suggestions have made to aid allocation criteria of AIIB, though it has not been
announced yet using Performance-Based Assessment (PBA). At the same time, the
thesis concludes the potential challenges facing AIIB in the last part of the thesis and
personal views of possible solutions are pointed out accordingly.
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11. Introduction
Infrastructure development is commonly believed to be a vital source of GDP growth.
Its significance in economic development was first strongly argued in World
Development Report (World Bank, 1994) and is repeated in World Bank Growth
Commission Report (World Bank, 2008). It’s now widely accepted that developing
countries and regions with high population density will to the large extent reduce
poverty and meet rapidly changing needs of people if they can deliver better facilities
in the swiftest and effective manner.
In the past decades, multilateral international organizations, such as International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) have achieved
some success to offer financial and technical assistance to developing countries
around the world and spared enduring efforts to help them fight poverty by providing
resources, sharing knowledge and facilitating regional cooperation. Despite that great
contributions have been dedicated by World Bank and ADB with lending capital
ranging from environmental protection to gender equality, some critics argue that they
are slow and bureaucratic, deter investment and build constraints for lending. Notably,
they still can neither address Asia’s growing infrastructure needs nor close the funding
gap. According to estimations from ADB, Asian regions will need as much as 8
trillion US dollars to address critical infrastructure needs by 2020 in order to maintain
economic growth.
Under this circumstance, the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
a multilateral lending institution with initial 50 billion US dollars and expected 57
member countries so far was established to offer long-term financing for
transportation, telecommunications and energy projects of Asian developing countries,
along with other corresponding development institutions in China, including Silk
Road Fund, New development Bank.
2Although the existence of AIIB might facilitate the regional development economic
growth, it will still confront skepticism and challenges, such as government
corruptions, and vulnerable law system etc. Possible solutions and its future path
should also be figured out to support the sustainable development of AIIB and
positive effects on its member countries.
1.1 Research objectives
The thesis mainly aims to investigate the role of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
in promoting economic growth in Asian developing countries. The long term
relationship between infrastructure development, ODA and economic growth is the
key interest of this objective. Besides the research of the role of AIIB, including its
economic and political objectives, the thesis also focuses on the differences between
AIIB and other International Organizations, such as ADB and World Bank.
The second objective of the thesis is to give suggestions to aid allocation criteria for
AIIB on the basis of traditional performance based assessment widely used by other
multilateral lending institutions. Final parts of the thesis target to find out challenges
and skepticismAIIB faces and possible solutions to the challenges.
1.2 Research Questions
The main purpose of the thesis is to provide possible answers to the following
research questions.
1) Under which circumstances are China-led AIIB established and what goals should
it achieve after core business being fully implemented.
2) What is the potential role of AIIB to promote economic growth on the basis of
understanding aid-growth and infrastructure-growth relationship.
33) What stands AIIB out compared with other international organizations
4) What suggestions and modifications can be made to aid allocation criteria for AIIB
5) What are the potential challenges to efficiently implement AIIB lending and daily
affairs
2. Literature Review
2.1 Literature Findings on aid-growth relationship
Over the past decades, great efforts have been made to identify empirically the impact
of multilateral lending on economic growth and development (aid-growth
relationships) in developing countries. This section aims to discuss the three aspects
in aid-growth relationship relevant to the thesis, namely, statistical difficulties in
estimation, the relationship between multilateral lending and key macroeconomics
variables and aid-growth relationship from regional and country-specific perspectives.
The statistical difficulties in estimating aid-growth coefficients are highly relevant
and lead to different empirical results. Primarily, two statistical difficulties, namely,
endogeneity in variables and inconsistency in estimators are announced. Boone
(1994), Hadjmichael et al (1995) and Durbarry et al. (1998) addressed the existence of
endogeneity in regressions by additionally introducing aid square as regressor and
concluded that multilateral lending is positively related to growth, but with decreasing
marginal returns to lending inflows. However, following the research of Boone and
Hadjmichael, Burnside and Dollar (2000) rejected the endogeneity in variables by
Durbin-Wu-Hansman statistics testing and also introduced an interaction term
between aid and an index of economic policy. They note that under an index of 3
policies (budget surplus, inflation and openness), measured by the indicator variable
4defined by Sachs and Warner (1995), aid plays a greater role on growth. In other
words, fewer policy distortions facilitate aid effectiveness. Recently, Tseday Jemaneh
Mekasha and Finn Tarp (2013) suggests a positive and statistically significant
long-run effect of aid on income by employing the VAR model (Vector Autoregressive)
to better address the inherent existence of endogeneity problems among variables.
The inconsistency problem in estimators are widely discussed as well.Recent research
argued that estimators Burnside and Dollar used are inconsistent so that the test
statistics are unreliable and improved the regression model by applying GMM
(Generalized Method of Moments model) and instrument variables. Markus Brückner
(2009) concluded the statistically significant positive effect on per capita GDP growth
of aid recipient countries using rainfall as instrument variables to generate exogenous
variation in per capita GDP of 47 LDC countries during the period 1960-2000 when
the endogenous response of foreign aid is quantified.
Many empirical findings deal with the relationship between aid and key
macroeconomics variables, especially in public and private investment and policy
index. Easterly (1999) has identified positive and significant aid-investment link, thus
concluding aid-growth link by employing financing gap model as called
Harrod-Domar-Chenery Two Gap model which predicts a fixed linear and one-to-one
relationship between growth and investment in the short run. Similarly, Obstfeld
(1999) also has found positive relationship between aid and investment and
consumption, thus promoting economic growth, provided that the economy is below
the steady state. The focus on private investment is also interesting. Mahadvi (1990)
has found a positive but insignificant relationship among private investment, private
credit, and aid but was challenged by Snyder(1996) who pointed out a statistically
significant negative association between aid and private investment. Hadjimichael et
al.(1995) focused on Sub-Saharan African Countries and found that the relationship is
positive for countries under structural adjustment and negative for countries with
negative per-capita growth. Faini et al (1991) and Bird and Rowlands (2001) have
5both pointed out an absent or even negative correlation between multilateral lending
and private credit, which contradicts the expectations of international lending
institutions to have a positive catalyst effect that can promote other capital flows,
thereby contributing to economic growth. Contrarily, Evrensel (2004)) compares the
cost of multilateral debt and private lending and argues that the effectiveness of aid is
highly related to the difference of two costs. The aid is expected to be effective if the
cost of multilateral debt is less than that of private lending, as private lending is more
closely related to the reputation and credibility of the recipients in implementing
policy reform.
Recently, the macroeconomics of aid continues to be a rich area for policy-relevant
research. Tony Addison and Finn Tarp (2015) of UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, Finland in
their recent paper “Aid Policy and the Macroeconomic Management of Aid” have
pointed out the positive relationship between aid and economic growth and human
capital as well by studying the supply-side of aid. However, the paper denies the
determined role of aid on the economic growth or human capital development since
the vulnerability of the development budgets resulted from the volatility of aid in less
developed countries and suggests that effective reconfiguration, design and
implementation of aid requires the deeper understanding of aid’s impact on policy
environment. However, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) argues that the aid-policy link
is not robust, hence making the arguments that aid is insignificant, irrespective of
economic policy.
Regional and country-specific aid-growth relationship is one of the heated empirical
research as well. Geographic, demographic and policy quality are taken into account
when empirical research conducted. Dalgaard et al (2004) has pointed out diminishing
effectiveness of aid in the geographic tropics from the perspectives of climate
variation. Mosley et al (1987) studies the aid-growth relationship through regions and
states that there is a positive impact of aid on growth in Asian and Latin America, but
a negative impact in Africa. Rajan and Subramanian(2005) pointed out a little robust
6evidence of a positive (or negative) relationship between aid inflows into a country
and its economic growth by using panel and cross sectional data. Evidence in the
paper states that aid works better in better policy or geographical environments, or
that certain forms of aid work better than others.In recent literature, Rachel M.
Gisselquist (2015) of UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, Finland explored the impact of
fragility of states in policy and legitimacy on aid effectiveness. He stated the
importance of considering varieties of fragility and applying of best practices
according to different features among states on the aid effectiveness.
Through literature review, majority of research are based on cross-country growth
regression on the aid, taking into account macroeconomics variables and how the
lending allocates to individual sectors within recipient countries. However, the sign of
coefficients between aid and economic growth relationship can be varied among
situations and further research is needed to confirm and improve.
2.2 Literature Findings on infrastructure-growth relationship
Well planned and well-implemented investments of developing countries are critical
in all stages of development. This section discusses direct and indirect impact on the
effects of infrastructure on productivity of inputs, statistical problems in finding the
infrastructure-growth relationship and regional issues on this topic as well.
Through increase in public spending on infrastructure, economic activities can change
both directly and indirectly. Infrastructure can be directly considered as additional
input in the production process or indirectly improve total factor productivity by
reducing transaction costs, ensuring an efficient use of traditional productive inputs.
Formal empirical literature and informal case studies on the infrastructure-growth
relationship, however, never reach a unanimous result. Early empirical research, for
example, Aschauer (1989) reported a positive relationship between infrastructure and
economic growth by estimating very high elasticity of private output with respect to
7public capital 0.35 to 0.45 which was confirmed in Munnell (1990), Otto and Voss
(1994). Achauer (1989) pointed out that slower growth in public capital accumulation
contributes to private sector productivity slowdown, thus leading to economic
downturn in the 1970s and 1980s. A report from IMF in 2014 ‘Is it time for an
infrastructure push? the macroeconomic effects of public investment’ finds out
positive relationship between public infrastructure investment and output in both short
and long term, especially in economic slack periods. However, the constitute of public
investment determines the degree of output increase via infrastructure development.
The report finds out that an increase in public investment that is debt financed would
have larger output effects than an increase that is budget neutral. Augustin Kwasi
Fosu (2014) focused on the Sub-Saharan African and estimated a strong long-run
relationship between public investment and growth by introducing various
econometric techniques, such as System GMM estimation and endogenous growth
model. The paper finds the growth maximizing public investment GDP share of about
10:2 percent and the complementary and crowding-out effects were detected strongly
between public and private investments. In addition to research on the direct effects of
infrastructure on productivity of inputs, some empirical literature has the attempt to
figure out indirect effect and externalities. Pierre-Richard Agenor and Blanca
Moreno-Dodson introduced indirect effects of health, education in endogenous
growth model in Agenor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) and discussed the optimal
allocation of public expenditures to find the infrastructure-growth relationship.
However, some empirical research tends to find smaller effects on
infrastructure-growth relationship and criticizes early literature with its
unsophisticated methodological approaches which ignore the non-stationary of
aggregate output and infrastructure capital, potential simultaneity between
infrastructure and income level and potential heterogeneity across countries (Calderon
et al, 2011, Esfahani and Ramirez, 2004). To address the problem of non-stationary
between two variables ( infrastructure and aggregate output), panel time-series
approach is widely used in the recent literature. César Calderón, Enrique Moral
8Benito, Luis Servén (2012) estimates a long-run aggregate production function
relating GDP to human capital, physical capital, and a synthetic measure of
infrastructure comprising transport, power and telecommunications by using a panel
time series and cross-country data set. The issue of potential simultaneity is also one
of the most problematic one. Generally speaking, there are two solutions. The first
solution is to use instrumental variable approach, ideally featuring outside instruments.
For example, Calderón and Servén (2003, 2008) employ demographic variables as
instruments -- alone or in combination with internal instruments -- in a generalized
method of moments (GMM) panel framework. The second solution is the use of the
use of stripped-down versions of Barro’s (1990), an endogenous growth framework in
which defines the welfare-maximizing level of productive expenditure that determines
whether the positive shocks to infrastructure stocks will increase the output. For
example, Canning and Pedroni (2004) added stochastic disturbances to Barro’s
structural equations and concluded that there is a growth maximizing level of
infrastructure above which the diversion of resources from other productive uses
outweighs the gain from having more infrastructure. Below this level, increases in
infrastructure provision increase long run income. The third problem, namely,
heterogeneity across countries is pervasive as well. Bogetic and Fedderke (2006)
deals with the problem by employing a pooled mean-group approach that allows for
unrestricted short-run heterogeneity in the impact of infrastructure and imposing
long-run homogeneity of its effects across countries or industries.
Regional issues on infrastructure-growth relation are the another widely-discussed
topic because aggregate economic growth on public infrastructure might veil the
individual sector performance. Morrison and Shwartz (1996) employed the state-level
data for US manufacturing sector and found out that infrastructure investment
provides a significant return to firms and augments productivity growth. Conolly and
Fox (2004) also suggests a positive and significant impact of public capital on private
multifactor productivity for manufacturing and wholesale and retail by analyzing data
throughout 11 sectors from year 1965-2001 in Australia. Stéphane Straub Charles
9Vellutini Michael Warlters examined infrastructure and economic growth in East Asia
in the World Bank Policy research paper (April, 2008) and concluded that the
encouraging effects on economic growth decrease gradually. More recently, Roberts
et.al.(2012) investigated the national and spatial impacts of the second largest
transportation project in China---the National expressway Network (NEN) on the
inequality reduction in real wage between urban and rural areas. The paper applies
innovative five-stage methodology which assigns values to key model parameters
through a mixture of calibration and estimation for parameter and structural new
economic geography (NEG) --based evaluation model instead of conventional
difference-in-difference approaches. The model results suggest Chinese real wages
increase after NEN investment, especially in East of China but no significant effect on
inequality reduction in real wage between rural and urban areas.
To conclude, research and studies on infrastructure-growth and aid-growth
relationship are far from unanimous and findings vary due to the difference in
methodological approaches, model selection and regional issues.
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3. Thesis Background
3.1 Overview of Asian Infrastructure Bank
Asia is one of the most dynamic and fast-growing regions. In order to support and
ensure fast growth and poverty reduction in Asia, the region requires overall national
infrastructure investment needs estimated to be 8 trillion over the 2010-2020 period or
$730 billion per year, in which 68% investment is for the new capacity and 32% is for
maintaining and replacing existing infrastructure, according to Asian Development
Bank ( ADB). The top 10 Asian countries for Infrastructure Investment needs in
2010-2020 are shown in the table 3.1
Table 3.1 Total National Infrastructure Investment needs in Asia 2010-2020
(Top 10 countries, US $ dollars)
Countries US dollars
PRC 4368
India 2172
Indonesia 450
Malaysia 188
Pakistan 179
Thailand 173
Bangladesh 145
Philippines 127
Vietnam 110
Kazakhstan 70
Sources: Infrastructure for Seamless Asia. ADB/ADBI (2009) and Stone
(2008);The Global Competitiveness Report 2011‐2012, World Economic Forum
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Asian Development Bank also estimated the four key infrastructure priority areas
(see table 3.2)
Table 3.2 Key infrastructure priority areas
(US $ dollars)
Sectors US (per year) % total
Energy 374 51
Transport 225 31
Telecommunication 96 13
Water and Sanitation 35 5
Sources: Infrastructure for Seamless Asia. ADB/ADBI (2009) and Stone (2008);
The Global Competitiveness Report 2011‐2012, World Economic Forum
However, the World Bank and ADB cannot close the infrastructure funding gap. The
ADB, for example lends only 10 billion annually for infrastructure and the World
Bank focuses more on gender equality and environmental protection. Under these
circumstances, AIIB was established.
AIIB is a multilateral lending institution aiming at financing infrastructure
development around Asia, including energy and power, transportation and
telecommunications, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, water supply
and sanitation, environmental protection, urban development and logistics, etc. and
closing the infrastructure funding gap under the objective of lean (a small efficient
management team and highly skilled staff), clean (an ethical organization with zero
tolerance for corruption), green (an institution built on respect for the environment).
Proposed by China in 2013, AIIB launched at a ceremony in Beijing in 2014 and had
57 Prospective Founding Members, including almost all Asian countries, major
countries outside Asia, such as Australia, Germany, UK, Switzerland, Sweden,
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Denmark, Norway, Finland, Spain, Italy etc. by 15th, Apr, 2015. United States, Japan
and Canada have no immediate intention to become prospective funding members and
North Korea, Taiwan’s applications were rejected.
3.2 Comparison of AIIB with other international lending
organizations
The AIIB is the first Asian-based international bank to be independent from the
Western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. Although AIIB has the same function with IMF, World
Bank and ADB as a lending institution, it still differentiates itself in membership,
shareholdings, financing, business and political goals etc.
3.2.1 AIIB and ADB
The Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB) is the institution that is most similar
to the AIIB in name, geographic coverage and likely structure. However, AIIB still
has its own features which serves as complements to ADB. AIIB and ADB have basic
differences in headquarters, leading country, settlement currency, business focus (see
table 3.3)
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Table 3.3 Basic differences between ADB and AIIB
ADB AIIB
Headquarter Manila Beijing
Year 1966 2013
Leading country Japan China
Settle currency US dollars To be announced
(US dollars, Chinese yuan or
AIIB basket currency)
Business and
funding focus
Sectors related to reduce poverty
and development, such as
infrastructure, health and education
etc
Infrastructure especially
Source: Author’s conclusion
Also, AIIB distinguishes with ADB in membership and shareholdings. The
comparison in the membership and shareholdings are shown in the table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 Comparison of AIIB and ADB in membership and shareholdings
ADB AIIB
Members in Asia 67 ADB members with
19non-regional
members
57 prospective funding
members with 20
non-regional members
Board of Directors 7 of 10 positions
reserved for regional
members
9 of 12 positions reserved
for regional members
Shareholdings Non-regional members
account for over 30% of
shareholdings 12.84%
shareholdings for Japan
75-25 split between Asian
and non-Asian Members
About 27% shareholdings
for China
Member of Pacific Island
states
13 island states in 48
regional members
None of island states in
regional members
Source: Author’s Conclusion
Obviously from the tables above, although AIIB welcomes more non-regional
members, it provides a more secure benefit for Asian Members by the mechanism of
75-25 split shareholdings than ADB does. In addition, AIIB gives China a big role
while gives Japan a smaller role compared with that of China.
Finally, AIIB and ADB have distinctions in financing and capital structure (see table
3.5). Although the scale of AIIB is smaller than that of ADB in the initial capital, if
successful in building reserves from retained earnings and other sources, it could
eventually reach a similar loan-paid-up capital ratio as ADB (12.7). However, AIIB
funding members have more pressure than ADB funding members in paid-up Capital.
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Table 3.5 Comparison of ADB with AIIB in Financing and Capital structure
(US $ billion dollars)
ADB AIIB
Initial capital 100 50
Paid-up capital 5.9 10
Loan Portfolio 7.5 Estimated
127
Loan-capital ratio 12.7 Estimated
12,7
Source: Various Press releases and annual reports (assessed on 30 March 2015 at the
MDB website)
In spite of differences between two international funding institutions, Asia needs two
banks to support growing demand for infrastructure funding and AIIB will not
compete ADB but complement AIIB, said by Chinese Authorities.
3.2.2 World Bank, IMF and AIIB
World Bank and AIIB are both international lending institutions and share many
similarities in spite of different business focuses, goals, management structure,
shareholdings etc. The past experience of World Bank could be a good lesson for
AIIB on its future development. However, IMF, is not a lending institution but a credit
union and has focused on unresolved financial problems, such as unpredictable
variation of currency exchanges. IMF oversees its members' monetary and exchange
rate policies and guards code of conduct.
To understand deeply the differences between World Bank, IMF and AIIB, we need to
know well major concerns of China and other Asian emerging countries when
engaging the business and voting in IMF and World Bank. The first concern is that the
16
unfair voting share in two institutions for Asian emerging countries. China and other
Asian emerging countries have argued a long time for their unfair voting share in IMF
and World Bank. In the case of IMF, China, Russia, India have far less voting shares
than they deserve according to the GDP sizes and the same situation happens in the
case of World Bank. For instance, the Executive Board of IMF gives France, with a
$3 trillion GDP, far more votes than China with a 2014 GDP of more than three times
as large at $10 trillion, or gives Belgium (1.86%) with a $500 billion GDP a larger
voting share than Brazil (1.72%) with a GDP more than four times as large at $2.2
trillion.
The second concern is the low efficiency of project preparation and risk aversion of
borrowing in the World Bank. The Ernesto Zedillo1’s report in October 2009 is quite
critical of the current World Bank arrangement of a resident board that approves all
loans. He argued that he World Bank is criticized by its inefficiency and bureaucracy
due to its unreasonable board and management structure, namely, resident board and
extra layer and implementation of environmental and social safeguards, which move
developing countries away from existing multilateral development bank to finance
infrastructure projects. In contrast, AIIB is expected to improve its board and
management structure to make business process more efficient and smoother by
introducing non-resident board.
Finally, the World Bank exists to encourage poor countries to develop by providing
them with technical assistance and funding for projects and policies that will realize
the countries' economic potential. AIIB focuses on middle-income countries and
regions in Asia and primarily on economics rather than politics. The following figure
briefly discusses the major differences between AIIB and World Bank. (see Table3.6 )
In spite of existing differences between AIIB,IMF and World Bank, the World Bank
1 Former president of Mexico, chaired the High-Level Commission on Modernization of World Bank Group
Governance
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highlighted the importance of undertaking "comprehensive structural reform
programs" in developing countries to promote growth, in line with the IMF World
Economic Outlook April 2015, released on Tuesday and both welcomed AIIB, hoping
to work hand-in-hand to prosper the LDCs.
Table 3.6 Comparison betweenWorld Bank and AIIB
World Bank AIIB
Voting Rights Voting power dominated
by Europeans and the
Americans
Voting power dominated by
Asian Emerging
countries, especially China
Goals Focused on both economics
and politics
Focused on economics and
less politics
Beneficiaries Developing countries Developing countries,
especially
Board and Management Resident Board with
financial cost $ 70 million
per year. Extra layer of
management
Non-resident board that
meets periodically in Beijing
or through video conference.
Delegate more decision
making to management
Efficiency Slow and Bureaucratic Expected to be quicker and
more efficient
Shareholdings Governments of its 180
member nations with equity
shares
75-25 split between Asian
and non-Asian Members
About 27% shareholdings
for China
Source: Author’s conclusion
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4. Research Methodology
4.1Theoretical Framework
In order to specify the theoretical framework, the research on the channels that
infrastructure impacts on the economic growth is required. In the book "Public Capital,
Growth and Welfare" by Pierre-Richard Agenor, he points out the potential channels
through which public capital may contribute to the long run GDP growth or income
per capita, including the productivity-channel, complementarity between public
infrastructure services and private inputs, education and health, the level of country’s
innovation capacity, efficiency of women’s time allocation, diffusion of existing
technology.
In the first Chapter of Agenor’s book, he employed two-period overlapping growth
(OLG) model to specify the channels through which public capital affects long-run
economic growth. Agenor finds out that the production inputs are complement,
implying that the increase of one input will also raise productivity of the other inputs,
thus reducing the cost of production unit. Therefore, the increase of public capital on
infrastructure will raise the productivity of private capital. For instance, the return
rate of building a factory in manufacture sector using private capital are likely to be
higher if the infrastructure such as transportation, electricity and water station is
already constructed. In addition, Agenor also points out the crowding-out effects,
meaning that production of new public capital depends not only the investment inflow
but also the existing public capital stock and the rises in public sector spending also
drive down or even eliminate private sector spending.
In the following chapter, the other important channels are discussed, among which
human capital is taken into account most commonly in empirical work. The public
investment on social infrastructure will benefit health and education of labor force,
thus inducing more literacy, better health condition and manpower skill which are
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important factors for higher productivity and growth.
In the basic framework, Agenor considered an economy populated by an infinitely
lived representative household, which produces and consumes a single traded good.
The government invests in infrastructure, spends on maintenance and meets its budget
by a flat tax rate on output. The production structure of the framework is relevant to
the thesis empirical work and is specified by Agenor as follows:
  1)( pG KeKY (1)
)/( GKMe  )1,0( (2)
pppp KIK  )1,0(P (3)
Output Y is produced by private capital pK and the effective stock of public
infrastructure capital GeK where 0e is the efficiency and is a concave function
of the ratio of public spending on maintenance, M, to the stock of public capital.
pI denotes gross private investment and p is the depreciation rate of private
investment. Also the production function is assumed to constant return to scale
Cobb-Douglas.
Under the background of the thesis, the neoclassical growth model should be adjusted
and is expected to include public capital, private capital, infrastructure stock ( tI ),
official development aid (ODA) 2and ease of doing business index ( tEODB ) which
will be discussed in the following section. Cobb-Douglas production function is
assumed to be constant return to scale. Also, in the model, the human capital is not
considered because AIIB primarily focuses on the infrastructure projects such as
energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural infrastructure and
2 Since part of ODA has been used for public investment, the double counting problem arises. The details and the
methodologies to exclude the problems are discussed in the Appendix 2.
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agriculture development etc. and little on social infrastructure such as school and
hospital that have a large impact on human capital accumulation. Therefore, the
human capital factor is negligible in AIIB case. The neoclassical growth model can be
adjusted as follows
),,,,,( ODAIEODBKpvtLFKpubfY ttt  (4)
Where tY is GDP per capita in an economy using inputs such as private ( pvtK )
capital, public capital ( )pubK , labor force (L), infrastructure stock ( )tI , Official
Development Aid (ODA). tEODB refers to the ease of doing business index available
at World Bank
After reviewing the theoretical framework of the growth model, the following
sections will deal with the measurement of the production inputs and set up the
econometric model for analysis.
4.1.1 Infrastructure Index
The existing empirical literature and working paper have developed some indicators
of physical infrastructure development to examine the relationship between
infrastructure development and economic growth, among which FTSE Global
Infrastructure Index Series, S&P Global Infrastructure Index and Global Infrastructure
Investment Index are commonly used and discussed. FTSE infrastructure index is
comprised of 6 broad industry sectors----3 core infrastructure sectors, namely,
transportation, telecommunication, energy and 3 infrastructure-related sectors, namely,
related Materials & Engineering, related Conveyance Services, related
Communications Services. FTSE global infrastructure index includes the companies
in the core sectors which generate 65% of revenue from infrastructure and employs
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capping methodology3to avoid overweight in any particular sectors.
S&P global infrastructure index has the same focus with FTSE global infrastructure
index on the 75 liquid and representative infrastructure companies worldwide but
takes three distinct infrastructure clusters: energy, transportation, and utilities. Also,
the infrastructure index serves as the investment benchmark. Investors and asset
owners need to be wary of the differing risks and potential opportunities each market
presents them with.
Global Infrastructure Investment Index is a dominant index for investors to well adopt
their investment strategy in economic infrastructure which takes into account 24
individual criteria including mainly 5 aspects, such as country risk, quality of existing
infrastructure, ease of doing business, political and social environment and financial
conditions etc.
For the AIIB case discussed in the thesis, we use the infrastructure indicators
presented by the World Bank of related Asian developing countries which correspond
to 6 infrastructure projects AIIB focuses 4 and develop the composite index of these
major infrastructure indicators. The infrastructure indicators are (1) Electricity Power
Consumption (KWh per capita) (2) Improved water source, rural (% of rural
population with access) (3) Rail Line (Total route-km) (4) Fixed (wired) broadband
subscriptions (per 100 people) (5) Air transport registered carrier departures, world (6)
Mobile Celluar Subscription (per 100 people). The six indicators can be used to well
represent the infrastructure development goal of AIIB.
3 Capping Method: an index construction method employs market capitalization weighting where each constituent
in the weighting is weighted by its float-adjusted market capitalization.
4 The AIIB infrastructure projects are (1) energy and power, (2) transportation and telecommunications, (3) rural
infrastructure and agriculture development, (4) water supply and sanitation, (5) environmental protection, (6)
urban development and logistics, etc
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In order to provide composite index5 of major infrastructure indicators, the
infrastructure index is derived from the principal component analysis, a commonly
used multivariate statistical technique and one of the most important results from
applied linear algebra. Principal Component Analysis, or simply PCA, is a statistical
procedure concerned with elucidating the covariance structure of a set of variables
and interprets the original data set into a few variables usually called as principal
components. The core part of PCA is the application of eigenvalues and in
computational terms, the principal components are found by calculating the
eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the data covariance matrix6. The table 4.1 shows the
Eigen values and variance. The final infrastructure index for China and the calculation
results for other 4 countries are presented in Appendix1. The table 4.2 presents factor
loading of original values according to eigenvalues and the factor loading of original
values of other 4 countries are also shown in Appendix 1.
Table 4.1 Eigenvalues and Variance explained by principal components (China)
Infrastructure Index for China
Principal
components
Values % of Variance Cumulative
values
1 5.733388 0.9556 0.9556
2 0.226142 0.0377 0.9933
3 0.029854 0.005 0.9982
4 0.005789 0.001 0.9992
5 0.00306 0.0005 0.9997
6 0.00176 0.0003 1
Source: Author’s Calculation
5 The thesis focuses on the impact of whole infrastructure stock on the economic growth, therefore, the composite
index is used instead of individual indices.
6 This process is equivalent to finding the axis system in which the co-variance matrix is diagonal. The
eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue is the direction of greatest variation, the one with the second largest
eigenvalue is the (orthogonal) direction with the next highest variation and so on.
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Table 4.2 Factors loading of original values (China)
China
Infrastructure
Variables
Loadings
Air transport registered carrier departures, world 0.416835
Electricity Power consumption( KWh per
capita)
0.415675
Fixed(wired)broadband subscriptions (per100
people)
0.39866
Improved water source, urban(%urban
population with access)
0.403092
Mobile phone subscription (per 100 people) 0.414716
Rail Line (Total route-km) 0.400075
Source: Author’s calculation
After calculating the eigenvalues and corresponding factor loading, we can derive the
final infrastructure index for the specific time period t and the formula is specified as
follows
ttt
tttt
RLMPSIWS
FBSEPCATRINDEX
*400075.0*414716.0*403092.0
*39866.0*415675.0*415835.0


(5)
Where tINDEX is final infrastructure index, tATR represents air transport
registered carrier departures, world, tEPC represents electricity power consumption
(KWh per capita), tFBS represents fixed (wired) broadband subscriptions (per100
people), tIWS represents improved water source, urban (% urban population with
access), tMPS represents mobile phone subscription (per 100 people) and
tRL represents rail line (Total route-km). For simplicity, a simple average of the
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loading values, that is approximate 0.4 can replace the actual loading values and will
not affect the final regression results.
4.1.2 Ease of doing Business Index
After defining the infrastructure index, it’s also important to consider ease of doing
business index in the empirical model. The ease of doing business index from gives
the equal weight to 10 indicators which assess the environment for investment, The 10
indicators are starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity,
registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes,
trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency.
Assessing the ease of doing business is relevant especially when doing infrastructure
projects since in developing countries, more progress is made to strengthen the
collaboration of private capital and public capital, such as the advocating PPP
(Public-private partnership) mode by Chinese government in 2014. A higher ease of
doing business index implies a more conducive environment for investment, therefore
providing a more favorable force for GDP growth and is expected to be positive in
coefficient.
4.1.3 Data Sources
World Development indicators—World Bank: Investment is defined as gross fixed
capital formation (% of GDP) and private capital (investment) is represented as Gross
fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP). Public capital (investment) is
obtained from the difference between the gross fixed capital formation and gross fixed
capital formation, private sector7, Labor force is taken from World development
indicator, total labor force and official development aid is represented by Net official
7 The data of gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% GDP) is unavailable for China and Indonesia in the
World Bank database. Under this situation, we only consider public investment in the two countries
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development assistance and official aid received (ODA) (current US dollars). The
data of domestic credit is extracted from World Bank indicator, domestic credit (% of
GDP). Annual data of GDP per capita (current US dollars) is used
World Bank Indices: Ease of doing business index is extracted from World Bank
doing business data.
The time period for research is 1992 to 2011
4.2 Econometric Model
Assuming a generalized Cobb-Douglas production function and extending the
neoclassical growth model to include infrastructure stock and official development aid
and separate capital into public and private, the neoclassical growth model introduces
more inputs and can be expressed in the natural logarithm in the following equations
to empirically examine the impact of infrastructure stock and ODA on the GDP for a
specific Asian country.
ttttttt μLnODALnEODBLnIndexLnLFLnKpvtLnKpubβtαLnGDP 
(6)
Where tGDP is real gross domestic product per capita, tKpvt is domestic private
investment (private capital), tKpub is public investment (public capital), LF is total
labor force, Index is infrastructure index which is discussed in the previous context,
tODA is official development aid. tLnEODB is the ease of doing business index.
βt is the trend term.
The empirical model studied has three problems needed to be avoided through
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suitable econometric methodology and refined data measurement. First, the reverse
causality problem in the empirical model is severe. Infrastructure development might
increase the productivity and efficiency in both public and private sectors, leading to
the output growth and economic development. However, it’s also possible and
understandable that the economic growth facilitate the demand for the infrastructure
development, for instance, the economic growth stimulates the social demand for
imported goods, which might generates the infrastructure construction of logistics
system. Therefore, whether infrastructure development leads to output growth or the
reversal of the relationship should be justified in the model. In order to ascertain the
direction of causality between infrastructure and GDP growth, Granger Causality (see
Engle and Granger, 1987) is applied. Engle points out that a variable X
Granger-causes Y if Y can be better predicted using the histories of both X and Y than
it can using the history of Y alone. However, Granger causality is not necessarily the
true causality since it may produce misleading results when the true relationship
involves three or more variables.
Second, the double counting problem also exists in the model. The official
development aid can be included in the public investment but it still appears as an
explanatory variable in the model. Aid is intended to affect growth via its effect on
investment. However, not all aid is intended for investment and not all investment is
financed by aid. If one adopts the approach of omitting investment, the regression is
misspecified and the estimated coefficient on aid is biased. Thus, it is clear that only
the coefficient on the aid variable is altered. Discussions about the problem can be
found in the existing empirical paper, such as Feeny,2005 which points out the
coefficient bias on the aid variable if either taking both as explanatory variables or
omitting one of them. In present papers, this problem is addressed by employing
transmission mechanism of investment. In cases where the ‘transmission’ variable (X)
has a positive effect on growth, and aid has a positive effect on the variable, this
method will provide for a larger coefficient on aid. If the variable has a negative effect
on growth, and aid is a positive determinant of the variable, the coefficient on aid is
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reduced. If it transpires that aid is not a determinant of the variable, there is no effect
and the method is not use. The details of transmission mechanism of investment and
regression results are discussed in the Appendix 1
The final problem is the endogeneity and the availability of long-run relationship
estimation. The possibility of more than one endogenous variables can lead to biased
estimates in the regression model if suitable methodologies are not adopted such as
instrument variables. The endeogeneity mainly arises due to the correlation between
ODA and income level (Boone 1994, Hadjmichael et al, 1995) and the correlation
between government expenditure on social infrastructure and income level as well.
Also, the thesis is interested in the long-run coefficient or relationship between key
variables. To address the problem, ARDL approach to cointegration might be the good
candidate for the following reasons. First, ARDL model better describes both the
short-run and long-run relationship between dependent and explanatory variables
which are both important to the research results. Second, ARDL Model has a wider
scope. Traditional method to deal with co-integration such as Johansen-Juselius (J-J)
is not effective if the variables don’t share the same order of integration, in the most
cases, I(1). However, ARDL Model can still be applied if the variables simultaneously
have I (1) and I(0). Finally, he ARDL approach to cointegration employed gives
consistent estimates in the presence of regressor endogeneity. Therefore, the
combination use of ARDL Model, along with Granger causality analysis might be the
optimal solution of the limitations in the empirical model the thesis studies.
To conduct the econometric analysis of the relationship between ODA, infrastructure
stock and economic growth, there are several major steps required to be followed. The
first step is to test for the existence of unit roots and determine the order of integration
of the variables before using ARDL Model due to the limitation of order of
integration using Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF test). For security,
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Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test8 is also applied to confirm the
non-existence of I(2) variables because KPSS test is preferred in smaller sample,
pointed out by some econometric literature.
The second step is to establish the error correction version of the ARDL model. The
optimal lag selection of error correction is based on Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
and the minimum value of AIC is the most preferable model. The general error
correction version of the ARDL model is shown as follows
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(7)
Next, the diagnostic test should be employed to test the stability and accuracy of the
error correction version of ARDL model. Five tests which are used commonly in
econometrics research, namely, CUSUM test, Heteroskedasticity Test with ARCH
method, Serial correlation LM test, Ramsey RESET Test and Normality Test are
applied.
The fourth step is to test the existence of long-run relationship between variables and
estimate the long-run coefficients if existing. The error correction version of ARDL
Model has the null hypothesis ( 0H ) stating that 07654321  
to confirm non-existence of long run relationship between variables. The bounds
testing is employed to check this long-run relation. To be specific, 0H (null
hypothesis) is rejected if the computed F-statistics exceeds the upper critical bounds
value and cannot be rejected if the computed F-statistics falls below the lower bound
8 KPSS test gives the double confirmation about the ADF test because some research literature has pointed out
more accuracy of KPSS test in small sample size (Yin Pui Mun and Lau Sim Yee,2013)
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value. However, the test becomes inconclusive if F statistic falls into the bounds. The
upper and lower bound values are extracted from Narayan (2004, p.1988) and Pesaran
et al. (2001, p. 300)
The fifth step is to check the direction of causality between infrastructure
development and output growth. Before determining the appropriate approach of
granger causality test, we need first take Johansen cointegration test9 to find if there
are cointegrating vectors among variables, infrastructure index and GDP. Although
most literature presents the similar results between these two methodologies, Mahdi
Mostafavi (2011) states in his paper when he tests for the long-run relationship
between GDP and inflation that Johansen method for testing cointegration is more
real and closer to theory in coefficient explanation compared with ARDL model to
cointegration when two variables are analyzed due to the different techniques in
estimation behind these two mentioned, i.e. Johansen method employs the Maximum
Likelihood Estimation while the ARDL employs Ordinary Least Square. If there is no
cointegrating vector, Cranger Causality VAR procedure is the candidate. We can test
for the absence of Granger causality by estimating the following VAR model
tptptptptt
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Then we can use F-test to check the short-run Granger Causality with the null
hypothesis..
0H : 0.........21  pbbb or X does not granger cause Y
0......21  pddd or Y does not granger cause X
In each case, a rejection of the null implies there is Granger causality.
9 This test permits more than one cointegrating relationship so is more generally applicable than the
Engle–Granger test which is based on the Dickey–Fuller (or the augmented) test for unit roots in the residuals from
a single (estimated) cointegrating relationship
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Primarily, we can derive two general models for Granger causality (see Engle and
Granger, 1987) depending on the order of integration of variables. If all the variables
are I (1) and cointegrated, the Granger Causality two-step VECM is basically given as
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Where lagged ECT is the lagged residuals from the cointegrating relation between Y
and X can be expressed as
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After establishing the Vector Error Correction function( VECM), we can use F-test to
check the short-run Granger Causality with the null hypothesis
0H : 0
1
1

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0
1
1


p
j
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Or the long-run Granger Causality using t-test with the null hypothesis
0H : 0y or Granger non-causality in the long run
0x or Granger non-causality in the long run
In each case, a rejection of the null implies there is Granger causality.
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5. Empirical Results and Discussions
This chapter presents the empirical results of long-run relationship in
infrastructure-growth and aid-growth in five Asian developing countries, namely,
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan. The five recipient countries of AIIB
demand the top in infrastructure aid and account for nearly 90% of the whole
infrastructure investment needs in Asia, estimated by ADB. This chapter only
discusses the case of China and Pakistan which rank the first and last in demand
among these five countries in detail and lists the empirical results of the other three
countries.
5.1 The Case of Pakistan
According to the steps discussed in chapter 4, ADF test and KPSS test are first
conducted. In order to employ ARDL, it’s necessary to ensure that the model
variables are not I(2), that is, the model variables should contain mixed order of
integration one and zero. The table 5.1 presents the results of ADF test to offer initial
conclusion of order of integration in variables.
Table 5.1 ADF test for unit root (Pakistan)
Variables ADF Test Conclusion
Level 1ST difference
GDP per capita -1.20 -3.57 * I(1)
KPUBT -1.46 -4.76 I (1)
KPVT -1.88 -7.81 I(1)
LF -3.32 -4.17 I(1)
ODA -3.26 -5.43 I(1)
INDEX -0.28 -5.70 I(1)
EODB 1.80 -6.92 I(1)
Source: Author’s Calculation
Note: * indicates significance at 10% level
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Also, KPSS test is applied to confirm the non-existence of I(2) variables.Since the
KPSS test has the different null hypothesis that an observable time series is stationary,
for simplicity, all the explanatory variables in the table 5.2 are differenced and the
rejection of the differenced time series variables indicate the acceptance of I(0)
variables. The test results are listed in the following table 5.2 10
Table 5.2 KPSS Test for unit roots (Pakistan)
Source: Author’s Calculation
Note: * and ** indicate significance at 10% and 5%, respectively
From the table above, we can safely conclude that the model variables don’t contain
order of integration two in spite of the different results calculated by two tests. After
optimal lag selection, the error correction version can be specified as follows
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10 The variables analyzed in KPSS test in the following context are all differenced.
Variables KPSS Test Conclusion
GDP per capita 0.16** I(0)
KPUBT 0.12 * I(0)
KPVT 0.12 * I(0)
LF 0.16 ** I(0)
ODA 0.13 * I(0)
INDEX 0.18** I(0)
EODB 0.16** I(0)
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In order to check the model stability and correctness, we set up five tests which are
used commonly in econometrics, namely, CUSUM test, Heteroskedasticity Test with
ARCH method, Serial correlation LM test, Ramsey RESET Test and Normality Test.
The model can be valid if it passes all the tests mentioned. The figure 5.1 presents the
CUSUM test results to make sure the stability of the model.
Figure 5.1 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUM of square of the ARDL model
Source: Author’s Calculation
The test results for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, normality and omitted
variables are stated as following table 5.3.
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Table 5.3 Diagnostic test results for ARDL Model (Pakistan)
Test Test
statistics
Probability
Value
Conclusion
Serial correlation
LM test
68.71 0.08 Cannot reject null hypothesis : No
serial correlation
Ramsey RESET
Test
0.79 0.57 Cannot reject null hypothesis:
Homoskedasticity
Heteroskedasticity
Test
ARCH method
0.98 0.34 Cannot reject null hypothesis: no
heteroskedasticity
Normality Test 1.05 0.59 Cannot reject null hypothesis:
Normally distributed
Source: Author’s Calculation
After testing the validity of the model, the regression can be made to estimate
long-run relationship between variables. To test the significance of long-run
relationship, we need to take Wald test (bound testing for ARDL model) and compare
F test statistics with critical values extracted from Narayan (2004, p. 1988) and
Pesaran et al. (2001,p. 300) for the corresponding order of integration. The following
table shows the ARDL bound testing results and estimates the coefficients between
explanatory variables and dependent variables GDP
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Table 5.4 Bound test results for Cointegration (Pakistan)
Test statistics Value df P Value
F statistic 73751.36 (7,1) 0.0167
Chi-Square 516259 7 0.0000
Critical values extracted from Narayan (2004, p. 1988)
Upper Bound Value in the case of intercept and no trend
I(0) I(1)
1%
5%
10%
4.768
3.353
2.752
6.670
4.774
3.994
critical values extracted from Pesaran et al. (2001,p. 300)
Upper Bound Value in the case of intercept and no trend
I(0) I(1)
1%
5%
10%
3.74
2.86
2.45
5.06
4.01
3.52
Source: Author’s Calculation
Note: The critical values of the lower bound and upper bound are obtained from
Narayan (2004, p.1988) and Pesaran et al. (2001, p. 300) for the case of unrestricted
intercept and no trend.
From the table 5.4, we can find that F statistic value exceeds the upper bound value of
1% significance level for I(0) and I(1) in both Narayan (2004, p. 1988) and Pesaran et
al. (2001,p. 300). Therefore, we can undoubtedly reject the null hypothesis that the
long-run coefficients are jointly insignificant. In order words, there exists a long run
relationship and the bound testing result provides the theoretical basis for estimation
for long run coefficients of variables from ARDL model. The estimated long-run
relationship coefficients are listed in the following table.
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Table 5.5 Estimated Long run coefficients of variables (Pakistan)
Dependent Variables: (LNGDP)
Variable Coefficient Std Error t statistics P Value
C -24.90137 5.5079 -4.521028 0.0007
LNKPUBT 0.745033 0.002705 275.386 0.0023
LNKPVT 0.413513 0.133628 3.094509 0.0093
LNLF 0.3416 0.385207 0.886958 0.3925
LNODA 0.549011 0.002124 258.4504 0.0025
LNINDEX 0.4598 0.4704 0.977568 0.3476
LNEODB 3.3473 2.50915 1.334038 0.2070
Source: Author’s Calculation
As indicated from the table5.5, we can clearly find out the positive relationship
between GDP per capita and explanatory variables in the long run in the case of
Pakistan. The variables, private investment, public investment, ODA. have
significantly positive impact on the economic growth for the case of Pakistan in the
long run. The estimated coefficient suggests that infrastructure stock, labor force, and
ease of doing business index, though might benefit the economic growth in Pakistan
in the short-run have no significant effect on the economic growth in the long run.
Since the problem of reverse causality is discussed in the previous context and other
econometric literature regarding the infrastructure-growth relationship, the
methodology of Granger causality test is employed to test the direction of feedback
between infrastructure and economic growth in selected countries. First, it’s necessary
and important to test for existence of cointegrating vectors using Johansen approach
because whether the use of Granger causality VECM method or Unrestricted VAR
method is determined by the test result. The table 5.6 presents the results of Johansen
approach to test for existence of conintegrating vectors between infrastructure and
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GDP.
Table 5.6 Results of Johansen test for cointegrating vectors (Pakistan)
Source: Author’s calculation
Note:
The test assumes a linear deterministic trend in the data.
The lag length selected by Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) for the
VAR analysis is two for model
The test result indicates no cointegrating vectors between two variables, infrastructure
index and GDP per capita. Therefore, Granger Causality test using unrestricted VAR
method should be applied in this case. The following two tables 5.7 and 5.8 represent
the regression results of unrestricted VAR model.
Test type Trace/Max
Eigenvalue
Trace/ Max-Eigen
statistic
0.05
Critical
Value
P value
Trace
None 0.304942 6.733852 15.49471 0.6088
At most 1 0.031832 0.549938 3.841466 0.4583
Max
Eigenvalue
None 0.304942 6.183915 14.26460 0.5897
At most 1 0.031832 0.549938 3.841466 0.4583
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Table 5.7 Regression results for VAR Model with dependent variable GDP
(Pakistan)
Dependent Variable: LNGDP
Coefficient Std.Error t Statistic P value
LNGDP(-1) 0.75906 0.255014 2.960254 0.0111
LNGDP(-2) 0.154411 0.247267 0.624470 0.5431
LNINDEX(-1) 0.260938 0.204622 1.275222 0.2245
LNINDEX(-2) -0.666992 0.249259 -2.675894 0.0190
Constant 4.612963 1.791792 2.574497 0.0231
Source: Author’s calculation
Table 5.8 Regression results for VAR Model with dependent variable
infrastructure index (Pakistan)
Dependent Variable: LNINDEX
Coefficient Std.Error t Statistic P value
LNGDP(-1) -0.378000 0.317631 -1.190059 0.2553
LNGDP(-2) 0.435997 0.307983 1.415654 0.1804
LNINDEX(-1) 1.179086 0.254866 4.626298 0.0005
LNINDEX(-2) -0.424260 0.310464 -1.366534 0.1949
Constant 2.047714 2.231759 0.917533 0.3756
Source: Author’s calculation
After estimating the coefficients of unrestricted VAR model, Granger Causality Wald
test should be taken to check the direction of causality between infrastructure stock
and economic growth. In the table 5.9, the coefficients of LNINDEX(-1) and
LNINDEX(-2) should be checked with the null hypothesis that both of them are 0,
which indicates non-existence granger causality from infrastructure stock to economic
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growth. Similarly, the coefficients of LNGDP(-1) and LNGDP(-2) should be tested
whether they are jointly significant, implying that economic growth granger causes
infrastructure stock. The result of Granger causality test using F statistics is listed in
the following table.
Table 5.9 Results of Granger causality test between infrastructure and GDP
Causality between Infrastructure and GDP
Dependent Variable 


p
i
itLNINDEX
1



p
i
itLNGDP
1
:0
1


p
i
i F-Statistics
(P value)
:0
1


p
i
i F-Statistics
(P value)
LNGDP 4.571755**
(0.0314)
LNINDEX 1.177299
(0.3389)
Source: Author’s Calculation
Note: **denotes 5% significance level
The optimal lag is selected on the basis of Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
As is shown in the table5.9, only the coefficient of lags of LNINDEX is significant at
5 percent level rejecting the null hypothesis of no Granger causality from
infrastructure development (Index) to economic growth (GDP). On the other hand, the
coefficient of lags of LNGDP is insignificant, indicating that there’s no Granger
causality from economic growth to infrastructure development (Index). Therefore, in
the case of Pakistan, we conclude that there exists one-way causality from
infrastructure development to economic growth.
40
5.2 The case of China
China is the leading country in Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and one
of the fast growing developing countries in the world for the past decades. Primarily
dependent on investment, China sustained high economic growth, export and
manufacture which might benefit from intensive development of infrastructure stock
in urban areas or even in parts of rural areas. In this context, the role of explanatory
variables such as investment, labor force, infrastructure and official development aid
in promoting economic growth in China will be discussed on the basis of empirical
results
In the case of China, the data of private capital (investment) is unavailable according
to World Bank database. Therefore, gross capital formation (% of GDP) is used
instead of separating investment into public capital (public investment) and private
capital (private investment). Also, the same situation happens in the case of Indonesia.
The following two tables provide the ADF test and KPSS results of all the model
variables. From the test results, we can safely conclude that no I(2) variables exist in
the ARDL model and all the variables are mixed order of integration in I(0) and I(1).
Table 5.10 ADF test for unit roots (China)
Source: Author’s Calculation
Note: *and**denote significance at 10% and 5% level
Variables ADF Test Conclusion
Level 1ST difference
LNGDP -1.27 -3.92 I(1)
LNINV -0.07 -4.13 ** I(1)
LNLF -5.67 --- I(0)
LNODA -3.00 -4.52 ** I(1)
LNINDEX -3.91 ** --- I(0)
LNEODB -2.06 -3.38* I(1)
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Table 5.11 KPSS test for unit roots (China)
Variables KPSS Test Conclusion
Level
LNGDP 0.14 * I(0)
LNINV 0.15** I(0)
LNLF 0.17 ** I(0)
LNODA 0.07* I(0)
LNINDEX 0.07* I(0)
LNEODB 0.19** I(0)
Source: Author’s calculation
*and ** denote significance at 10% level and 5% level, respectively
The optimal lag and its corresponding ARDL model of error correction version can be
specified as follows
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(10)
The following table concludes the test results of serial correlation LM test, Ramsey
RESET test, Jarque-Bera Normality test and Heteroskedasticity Test with ARCH
Method and the figure 5.2 plots the stability test CUSUM and CUSUM of square of
the model. The results of all the test confirm the validity and suitability of the model.
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Table 5.12 Diagnostic test results for ARDL Model
(China)
Test Test statistics Probability
Value
Conclusion
Serial correlation
LM test
79.55 0.07 Cannot reject null hypothesis :
No serial correlation
Ramsey RESET
Test
2.25 0.37 Cannot reject null hypothesis:
Homoskedasticity
Heteroskedasticity
Test
ARCH method
3.43 0.085 Cannot reject null hypothesis:
No heteroskedasticity
Normality Test 0.51 0.77 Cannot reject null hypothesis:
Normally distributed
Source: Author’s Calculation
Figure 5.2 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUM square of ARDL Model (China)
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The table 5.12 presents the F statistics of ARDL bound test and compares with
Narayan (2004, p. 1988) and Pesaran et al. (2001,p. 300) . From the table 5.13, we can
clearly find that statistic value far exceeds both Pesarn and Narayan’s upper bound
critical value at 1% significance level, indicating that the long run relationship surely
exists between variables and offering foundation for estimation of long-run
coefficients. The table 5.13 estimates the long run coefficients of variables in the case
of China
Table 5.13 Bound test results for cointegration
(China)
Source: Author’s Calculation
Test statistics Value df P Value
F statistic 626.97 (5,1) 0.0303
Chi-Square 3134.85 5 0.0000
Critical values extracted from Narayan (2004, p. 1988)
Upper Bound Value in the case of intercept and no trend
I(0) I(1)
1%
5%
10%
4.768
3.353
2.752
6.670
4.774
3.994
Critical values extracted from Pesaran et al. (2001,p. 300)
Upper Bound Value in the case of intercept and no trend
I(0) I(1)
1%
5%
10%
3.74
2.86
2.45
5.06
4.01
3.52
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Table 5.14 Estimated long run coefficients of Variables (China)
Dependent Variable : LNGDP
Variables Coefficient Std.Error t-Statistic P Value
Constant -27.88457 23.57540 -1.182783 0.2581
LNINV 0.513648 0.119999 4.280444 0.0009
LNLF 0.681599 1.191686 0.571962 0.5771
LNODA 0.003817 0.058444 0.065318 0.9489
LNINDEX 0.414426 0.142292 2.912507 0.0121
LNEODB 0.480930 0.252231 1.906707 0.0789
Source: Author’s Calculation
As indicated in the table, all the coefficients except official development aid and labor
force are significant in the long run. The coefficients of investment and infrastructure
stock are significant at 1% level and infrastructure stock is significant at 5% level.
However, in the long run, the official development aid has little effect on the
economic growth for the case of China in the past two decades. As is shown in the
table, the government expenditure in public sector, especially in infrastructure stock
might be the determinant factor in promoting economic growth in China for the past
20 years and also the favorable level of business environment for investment is also
important for economic growth in China.
Next, as mentioned in the previous context, we need to make sure the direction of
causality between infrastructure and economic growth using granger causality test.
The first step is to test the existence of cointegrating vectors in the two variables using
Johansen Cointegrating test. According to the test result in the following table, the
corresponding method for Granger causality test will be decided. The test result is
listed in the table as follows
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Table 5.15 Results for Johansen test for cointegrating vectors (China)
Source: Author’s calculation
Note
The test assumes a linear deterministic trend in the data.
The lag length selected by Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) for the
VAR analysis is two for model
After Johansen cointegrating test, we find that both trace and max eigenvalue tests
denote the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors and indicate
there exists at most 1 cointegrating vectors among variables. Therefore, the Granger
Causality test using VECM method is the appropriate way to check the direction of
causality. The following two tables show the results of Granger Causality test with
VECM method.
Test type Trace/Max
Eigenvalue
Trace/
Max-Eigen
statistic
0.05
Critical
Value
P value
Trace
None* 0.628077 16.83899 18.39771 0.0815
At most 1 0.001458 0.024810 3.841466 0.8748
Max Eigenvalue
None * 0.628077 16.81418 17.14769 0.0558
At most 1 0.001458 0.024810 3.841466 0.8748
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Table 5.16 Regression results for VECMModel with dependent variables GDP
(China)
Source: Author’s Calculation
Table 5.17 Regression results for VECMModel with dependent variable
Infrastructure index (China)
Dependent Variable : D(LNINDEX)
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t statistic P value
Lagged ECM
Term
0.019118 0.044507 0.429544 0.6758
D(LNGDP(-1)) 0.604268 0.400063 1.510432 0.1591
D(LNGDP(-2)) -0.496968 0.356047 -1.395793 0.1903
D(LNINDEX(-1)) -0.284316 0.261967 -1.085313 0.3010
D(LNINDEX(-2)) -0.307986 0.259524 -1.186731 0.2603
Constant 0.167225 0.070078 2.386274 0.0361
Source: Author’s Calculation
Dependent Variable : D(LNGDP)
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t statistic P value
Lagged ECM
Term
-0.053143 0.023393 -2.271768 0.0442
D(LNGDP(-1)) 0.661980 0.210276 3.148147 0.0093
D(LNGDP(-2)) -0.371941 0.187141 -1.987488 0.0723
D(LNINDEX(-1)) 0.035912 0.137692 0.260817 0.7991
D(LNINDEX(-2)) 0.063397 0.136408 0.464759 0.6512
Constant 0.087310 0.036833 2.370390 0.0371
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In order to test the long run and short run Granger causality between infrastructure
stock and economic growth, the Wald test ( F statistics ) for the joint significance of
coefficients of lags of LNINDEX or LNGDP to confirm the short run causality. T
statistics for the significance of coefficients of lagged ECM term is also required to
check the long run causality. The following table concludes the Wald test and t test
results for the coefficient significance in Granger causality.
Table 5.18 Results of Granger causality test hhh(China)
Causality between Infrastructure and GDP
Dependent
Variable 


p
i
itLNINDEX
1



p
i
itLNGDP
1
Lagged ECM term
:0
1


p
i
i
F-Statistics
(P value)
:0
1


p
i
i
F-Statistics
(P value)
0, yx
T statistics
(P value)
D(LNGDP) 0.122584
(0.8858)
-0.053143
(0.0442)
D(LNINDEX) 1.529670
(0.2593)
0.019118
(0.6758)
Source: Author’s Calculation
As indicated in the table, lagged ECM term is significant at nearly 5% rejecting null
hypothesis of no granger causality from infrastructure to economic growth and
indicating long run granger causality between two variables. At the same time,
insignificant coefficients of lags of itLNGDP and lagged ECM term show that
there exists no granger causality from economic growth to infrastructure both in the
short run and long run.
48
5.3 Empirical results of other countries
This section briefly concludes the long-run relationship between economic variables
in three other Asian countries, namely, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. For simplicity,
only the optimal lag selection for the ARDL model, long-run coefficient estimation
and other highly related test results will be provided in this part. This part begins with
the ADF and KPSS test results for the unit roots for each of countries.
First, all the three countries are qualified for ARDL model since no I(2) variables
shown from two test results for the three countries. The following table shows the
ADF test results for the variables in all the three countries.
Table 5.19 ADF test for unit roots
(India, Indonesia and Malaysia)
ADF test results
India Indonesia Malaysia
Variables
LNGDP I(1) I(1) I(1)**
LNKPUBT
(LNINV)
I(1)* I(1) I(1)
LNKPVT I(1)** - I(1)**
LNLF I(1) I(1) I(1)
LNODA I(1) I(0) I(0)
LNINDEX I(1)* I(1) I(1)
LNEODB I(0) I(1) I(0)
Source: Author’s calculation
Note:*and **denote significance at 10% and 5% level.
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Table 5.20 KPSS test for Unit roots
(India, Indonesia, Malaysia)
KPSS test results
India Indonesia Malaysia
Variables
LNGDP I(0)** I(0)** I(0)**
LNKPUBT I(0)* I(0) I(1)
LNKPVT I(0)* - I(0)*
LNLF I(0)* I(0) I(0)*
LNODA I(0)** I(0) I(1)
LNINDEX I(0)** I(0)* I(0)**
LNEODB I(0)** I(0)** I(0)*
Source: Author’s calculation
Note: *and **denote significance at 10% and 5% level.
After selecting the optimal lag, the ARDL error correction version for the three
countries are specified in the following table with the minimum values of Akaike
Information criteria and the models for the three countries pass all the diagnostic test,
such as serial correlation LM test, heteroskedasticity with ARCH methodology,
Normality test and Ramsey RESET Test. At the same time, CUSUM test results show
the stability for the three models. The following table concludes the optimal lag
selection and the corresponding error correction version of ARDL model.
The following table concludes the bounds testing results for the three countries and
provides foundation for long run coefficients estimation in the table.
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Table 5.21 Bound test results for cointegration
(India, Indonesia and Malaysia)
Source: Author’s calculation
Table 5.22 Estimated long run coefficients of variables
(India, Indonesia and Malaysia)
Source: Author’s calculation
As indicated in the table 5.22, all the variables have positive effect on economic
growth in the long run for the three countries. For the case of India, almost all the
variables are significance at 5% except public investment and ease of doing business
11 The data of private capital is not available from the World Bank database. Therefore, the gross
fixed capital formation (% of GDP) is used to define the whole investment, including public
capital and private capital instead of separating
Countries F statistic
( P value)
df
India 286.6963
(0.0454)
(7,1 )
Indonesia 61.10471
(0.0982)
(7,1)
Malaysia 274.4435
(0.0464)
(7,1)
Dependent Variable: LNGDP
India Indonesia Malaysia
Variables Coefficient
(P value)
Coefficient
(P value)
Coefficient
(P value)
LNKPUBT
(LNINV)
0.174500
(0.2467)
0.33376511
(0.3593)
0.196305
(0.4998)
LNKPVT 0.404954
(0.0495)
_ 0.198571
(0.0993
LNLF 2.334196
(0.0506)
2.02812
(0.0088)
1.888119
(0.0126)
LNODA 0.318132
(0.0333)
1.176595
(0.0609)
0.161072
(0.0384)
LNINDEX 0.682903
(0.0343)
0.802163
(0.0079)
0.173309
(0.7786)
LNEODB 0.575147
(0.1959)
1.681062
(0.1323)
3.845749
(0.1307)
Constant -47.41626
(0.0232)
-39.92268
(0.03593)
-36.5195
(0.0004)
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index. For the case of Indonesia, both coefficients of ODA and infrastructure stock
are significant in the long run. For the case of Malaysia, the coefficient of
infrastructure stock is insignificant but ODA is significant. At the same time, labor
force has the relatively high significance among variables in the three countries
The following table 5.23 presents results the Johansen cointergrating and the
corresponding methodology. And the table 5.24 -5.26 show the F statistics to make
sure the direction of effect between infrastructure stock and economic growth for the
country India, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Table 5.23 Johansen test results for cointergrating vectors
(India, Indonesia, Malaysia)
Countries Test results Methodology
India One integrating vector Granger causality test with
VECM
Indonesia No integrating vectors Granger causality test with
VAR
Malaysia No integrating vectors Granger causality test with
VAR
Source: Author’s calculation
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Table 5.24 Results of Granger Causality test between infrastructure and GDP
(India)
Causality between Infrastructure and GDP
Dependent
Variable 


p
i
itLNINDEX
1



p
i
itLNGDP
1
Lagged ECM term
:0
1


p
i
i
F-Statistics
(P value)
:0
1


p
i
i
F-Statistics
(P value)
0, yx
T statistics
(P value)
D(LNGDP) 0.641004
(0.5454)
-0.833985
(0.1008)
D(LNINDEX) 0.240749
(0.7901)
0.363213
(0.5335)
Conclusion:
There exists one way granger causality between infrastructure and economic growth
and infrastructure stock granger causes economic growth in the long run but no
short-run relationship. .
Source: Author’s calculation
Table 5.25 Results of Granger Causality test between infrastructure and GDP
(Indonesia)
Source: Author’s calculation
Causality between Infrastructure and GDP (Indonesia)
Dependent
variables 


p
i
itLNINDEX
1



p
i
itLNGDP
1
:0
1


p
i
i F-statistics
( P value)
:0
1


p
i
i F-statistics
(P value)
LNGDP 1.036859
(0.3821)
LNINDEX 5.487190
(0.0187)
Conclusion
There exists one way granger causality between infrastructure and economic growth
and economic growth granger causes infrastructure stock.
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Table 5.26 Results of Granger Causality test between infrastructure and GDP
(Malaysia)
Causality between Infrastructure and GDP (Malaysia )
Dependent
variables 


p
i
itLNINDEX
1



p
i
itLNGDP
1
:0
1


p
i
i F-statistics
( P value)
:0
1


p
i
i F-statistics
(P value)
LNGDP 1.619939
(0.2354)
LNINDEX 3.3511990
(0.0670)
Conclusion
There exists one way granger causality between infrastructure and economic
growth and economic growth granger causes infrastructure stock at 10%
significance level.
Source: Author’s calculation
5.4 Empirical Results analysis
In order to well analyze the significant role of AIIB, the following table concludes
empirical results of the top five countries in terms of aid demand. The table provides
the major conclusions of long-run relationship between variables for each of five
countries, especially, the two concerned relationship: infrastructure development and
economic growth and ODA and economic growth. The table5.27 also presents the
granger causality between infrastructure development and economic growth in five
countries.
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Table 5.27 Conclusions of key interests of the thesis for five selected countries
Key interests
Long run coefficients
between infrastructure
development and GDP
per capita
Long run coefficients
between ODA and
GDP per capita
Granger causality
between infrastructure
development and GDP
per capita
Countries Coefficient
( P value)
Coefficient
(P value)
Conclusion
China 0.414426
(0.0121)
0.003817
(0.9489)
One way direction
Infrastructure
development granger
causes economic
growth
India 0.682903
(0.0343)
0.318132
(0.0333)
One way direction
Infrastructure
development granger
causes infrastructure
development
Indonesia 0.802163
(0.0079)
0.318132
(0.0609)
One way direction
Economic growth
granger causes
infrastructure
development
Malaysia 0.173309
(0.7786)
0.161072
(0.0384)
One way direction
Economic growth
granger causes
infrastructure
development
Pakistan 0.4598
(0.3476)
0.549011
(0.0025)
One way direction
Infrastructure
development granger
causes economic
growth
Source: Author’s Calculation
From the table5.27, we can find that all the coefficients of variables interested are
positive for five countries, implying that infrastructure development and official
development aid indeed promote economic growth in the long run. The thesis also
introduces the Granger causality test to check the causality direction between
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infrastructure development and economic growth. From the table, all of the countries
have the one way direction of causality. Infrastructure development causes the
economic growth for China, Pakistan and India while GDP growth causes
infrastructure development for the other two countries.
To conclude, the nonnegative coefficients of infrastructure index and ODA indicate
that AIIB potentially exerts a positive impact on its top five recipients in the long run
after the official development aid or other development fund for the infrastructure
projects are allocated. The significance degree of key interested variables implies that
at least one factor (either ODA or Infrastructure development) plays key role in
facilitating the economic growth in five countries. AIIB, as a complementary
institution to ADB, through addressing the financing problem of ever growing
infrastructure needs in Asia, indeed benefits major recipient countries. Although no
further research on other small recipient countries, some literature has shown the
positive long run relationship between infrastructure, ODA and economic growth,
such as Vietnam and Thailand. For example, Nguyen Xuan Thanh and David Dapice
state in their paper “ Vietnam’s infrastructure constraints” that over the past twelve
years, total infrastructure investment has accounted for more than 10 percent of GDP
on average, putting Vietnam ahead of most East Asian economies. ADB forecasted in
Asian Development outlook 2015 that Thailand is expected to lift GDP growth to
3.6% in 2015 and 4.1% next year after public fixed investment rises in 2015 for the
approved infrastructure program that includes $95 billion in investments over 8 years
in railways, roads, ports, airports, and special economic zones. From that, safe
conclusions can be made that AIIB might also benefit other smaller developing
countries in Asia.
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6. Suggestions for AIIB aid allocation criteria
This chapter introduces the widely used aid allocation system---performance-based
aid allocation (PBA) and its criteria for selectivity adopted by most international
monetary institutions, such as World Bank, Africa Development Bank and Asian
Development Bank. Then, the possible suggestions for proper modifications will be
given to the aid allocation criteria for AIIB on the basis of PBA. The modifications
aim at improving the effectiveness and distinguishing AIIB with other multilateral
lending institutions based on its “specialist” on infrastructure projects.
6.1 Brief review of Performance-based Allocation System (PBA)
Performance-based Allocation System is the most explicit and commonly used aid
allocation system among international monetary institutions. Initially introduced by
World Bank for allocation of International Development Association (IDA) funds,
performance-based Allocation System is influential and replicated in other
multilateral development banks as well, such as Africa Development Bank (AFDB)
and Asian Development Bank (ADB).
The Performance-based Allocation System attempts to combine three principles,
namely, effectiveness, equity and transparency and ranks the developing countries
according to their priorities for the development aids. The PBA formula is a weighted
geometric function of the composite country performance rating, per capita income
and population. The country performance rating is assessed annually using the
Country Policy and Institutional assessment rating (CPIA) and is the most determined
part, implying the high weighting in the PBA system. The CPIA aims to assess the
country policy and institutional framework and has 16 indicators of four equally
weighted clusters 1) Macroeconomic Management 2) Structural policies 3) Policies
for social inclusion and equity 4) Public sector Management and institutions. The 16
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indicators and 4 clusters are shown in the following figure provided by World Bank
IDA’s performance-based allocation system.
Figure 6.1 16 Indicators in 4 clusters of CPIA for IDA
Source: IDA. 2006. Post Conflict Performance Indictors (PCPIs) 2006. Washington,
DC.
In addition to CPIA, Portfolio Performance Rating (PPR) capturing the quality of
management of IDA’s projects and programs, enters the calculation of the CPR as
well. The PPR follows major three steps. First step is the measurement and
identification of problem projects using specific criteria differed among institutions.
Then, the problem projects are adjusted for the average age of the projects since
younger portfolio are less vulnerable to risk and take a longer time to be exposed.
Principally, for each year that a country’s portfolio is younger than the average age,
the percentage of projects at risk is increased by five percent. Final step is the
conversion percentage of problem projects into rating scale.
A. Economic Management (Average scores of 1-3)
1. Macroeconomic Management
2. Fiscal Policy
3. Debt Policy
B. Structural Policies ( Average scores of 1-3)
4. Trade
5. Financial Sector
6. Business Regulatory Environment
C. Policies for Social Inclusion ( Average scores of 1-5)
7. Gender Equality
8. Equity of Public Resource Use
9. Building Human Resources
10. Social Protection and Labor
11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability
D. Public Sector Management and Institutions( Average scores of 1-5)
12. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance
13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management
14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization
15. Quality of Public Administration
16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector
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The country rating performance formula for IDA’s fund resources of World Bank is
specified as follows
Country Performance Rating PPRCPIACPIA DCA *08.0*68.0*24.0   (11)
where CACPIA  is the average ratings of CPIA clusters A to C, DCPIA is the rating of
CPIA cluster D, and the PPR reflects the health of the IDA projects portfolio, as
measured by the percentage of problem projects in each country However, the country
rating performance formula is not necessarily specified the same, different institutions
define different formula which suits for the purposes and structure of the development
fund. For example, Asian Development Bank adopts different formula as follows
Country Performance Rating = 3.00.17.0 )(*)(*)( PPRCPIACPIA DCA (12)
While country performance is the main determinant in core PBA system, the country
needs which are measured by GNI per capita and population still remains to give final
rating. These two factors have contrary effects on the aid allocation. Specifically, the
increase in population results in increase in aid allocation while countries with lower
GNI per capita receives theoretically higher aid allocation. The final PBA score for
country i is calculated in the following formula according to the IDA aid allocation of
World Bank
   

 N
i ii
ii
i
taGNIpercapiPOPCPR
taGNIpercapiPOPCPR
PBA
1
125.05
125.05
**
)(**
(13)
However, the weighting of three variables in PBA calculation can be different among
institutions. For example, in ADB case, country performance rating is given
weighting 2 instead of 5, together with GNI per capita -0.25 and population 0.6
instead of -0.125and 1 in the World Bank case. The PBA calculation is defined as
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following formula in the ADB case
  

 N
i iii
iii
taGNIpercapiPOPCPR
taGNIpercapiPOPCPR
PBA
1
25.06.000.2
25.06.000.2
i
**
**
(14)
After figuring out the PBA of each country ( also called country allocation share in
the context of ADB case), the final lending level is then calculated by multiplying the
expected Development Fund commitment authority by its country allocation share
(PBA).
Also, PBA system itself has undergone several historical changes in its calculation
methodology, especially in the selection of weighting values both in whole PBA
function and CPR function. The PBA system has evolved in recent two decades
though the no significant changes in basic methodology but the weighting value and
elements in PBA have changed gradually and the existence of different calculations is
either due to the improving estimates of weighting values or more suitability of
different situations for aid allocation.
6.2 Possible suggestions forAIIB aid allocation
Although Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a newly-established
multilateral development bank with no further strategy and specific methodology for
aid allocation, the Bank's foundation is built on the lessons of experience of existing
MDBs and the private sectors. Therefore, it is reasonable to reckon that the PBA
system with suitable modification can be still adopted with highest probability.
However, traditional framework of PBA system that is similar to other institutions
should be modified according to the nature, function and objective of AIIB.
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6.2.1 Consideration of Infrastructure Factors
The first modification I suggest to the AIIB aid allocation method based on PBA
system is the consideration of infrastructure factors. The AIIB which focuses on the
development of infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia takes special
consideration into the infrastructure projects and public sector productivity. Therefore,
the correlation between existing infrastructure and economic growth of the recipient
countries should be taken into account. However, the traditional PBA system gives
little emphasis on the infrastructure factors in country performance rating.
The CPIA offers more weights on policy and management rating and has no clusters
relevant to infrastructure-growth relationship. Therefore, it will be better and more
suitable to add one more cluster which presents the long-run relationship between
infrastructure and economic growth for each recipients. The measurement of the
infrastructure-growth relationship can be derived from the coefficients12 calculated
through empirical ARDL model mentioned in the chapter 4. The countries can be
divided into several groups and ranked according to their degree of correlation
(between infrastructure and economic growth). The highest rating scores are given to
those countries with closer and positive long –run correlation, then second highest
rating scores are given to second country group and so on. This cluster implies that
those countries with higher rating score might function better on infrastructure
projects if the aid from AIIB is received. When calculating the country performance
rating, this cluster should be offered proper weighting. However, the weighting value
needs to be researched and confirmed will not be discussed in the thesis.
6.2.2 The modification in portfolio performance rating
The basic methodology for portfolio performance rating is to calculate the percentage
of problem projects with adjustment of average age of the projects. The basic
12 The coefficients calculated in Chapter 4 might be re-estimated after AIIB starts its work according
to the real situation in the recipient countries at that time
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methodology takes into consideration of all the problem projects while in the AIIB
case, the funded projects are almost infrastructure projects. Therefore, the basic
methodology might be less accurate and lead to biased results which are either
magnify or narrow the effects of the portfolio performance rating on the country
performance rating in AIIB case. Therefore, the second modification of PBA system
for AIIB is to calculate the percentage of infrastructure projects at risk to the
aggregate problem projects after adjustment of average age as well. Then, the average
scores for these two indicators (or specific weighting values) serve as final value of
portfolio performance rating.
6.2.3 The modification in the governance rating
The final modification that AIIB can take into consideration is to give more scores on
the two indicators---Quality of public administration and Transparency, accountability
and corruption in the public sector instead of taking average scores of all the five
indicators in the cluster--- Governance rating. Traditionally, public sectors or
governments of developing countries appropriated all aspects of infrastructure, with
private participation taking very little responsibility, that is to say, the performance of
public sectors plays a more important in aid effectiveness. Therefore, it’s reasonable
to consider to calculate governance rating with high weight in these two indicators.
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7. The challenges of AIIB and possible suggestions
The previous chapters discuss the important role of Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) in promoting the economic growth through infrastructure projects in the
long term. However, AIIB is criticized and questioned by foreign media and some
economists, especially US media for its overlapping function with Asian
Development Bank (ADB), potential corruption, bad consequences on environment.
7.1 Overlapping functions with ADB
Although AIIB was initially positioned as the complementary institution for ADB, it
still has some similar functions with AIIB, especially the allocation of loans from
development fund. These similarities have raised the criticism for resource waste in
physical and human capital. It might be meaningless to establish a multilateral
institution in such a big effort that has the similar function with ADB and it seems to
serve more as a political instrument for the leading country, China. However,
proponents of AIIB have stated that it’s reasonable to have AIIB because the huge
infrastructure financing needs facing by Asian developing countries and it might be
impossible to cater the huge financing needs through only one institution.
Therefore, the overlapping problems will remain a challenge for AIIB if the relevant
focus and function are highly similar. In order to address the problem, I have
following two possible suggestions. First, AIIB and ADB could focus on different
types of recipients for aid allocation in infrastructure projects. For example, AIIB can
focus on middle-income Asian developing countries while ADB lays its focus on
relatively low-income countries. The two institutions have the different standard of
country performance assessment based on their focus when allocating loans for
infrastructure projects.
Second, AIIB and ADB could focus on different contents of infrastructure projects.
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For instance, as mentioned by AIIB, its major focuses of infrastructure projects are
energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural infrastructure and
agriculture development, water supply and sanitation, environmental protection, urban
development and logistics. Therefore, it’s wise and efficient for ADB to have
divergent focuses on other infrastructure contents. To facilitate strong collaboration
between AIIB and ADB, the suggestions mentioned could be taken into consideration.
7.2 Potential corruption in AIIB
As a multilateral lending institution, it might unavoidably face the problem of
potential corruption and lack of openness of its operations, especially AIIB, a newly
established institution with membership in Asia which most rank almost last in aid
transparency index in two consecutive years 2013 and 2014. Therefore, many critics
concerned that the aid and loan provided by AIIB might not promote infrastructure
development and economic growth in recipients for the reason of corruption. At the
same time, the problems of corruption not only exist in recipient countries but also in
the AIIB itself. According to U.S. China, as the leading country in AIIB, has the
nearly 27% voting right and it’s worrisome that China ranking dead last in aid
transparency index might convict corruption and vote for its own interest.
Regarding two challenges mentioned, introducing the monitoring party, giving high
weighting for transparency, accountability, corruption index in country performance
assessment and tracking the aid utilization might be a good help. For the problem of
recipients’ corruption, the country performance assessment should give the
transparency index high weighting instead of averaging 6 indicators of Public Sector
Management and Institutions. The weight can be adjusted by the historical average
ranking of transparency index of each country, that is, higher ranking with lower
weighting. However, the minimum weight for this indicator should at least larger than
others. At the same time, AIIB should track the process of the infrastructure projects
and the utlization of the aid after loaning for the recipients. On the other hand, for the
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problem of corruption in AIIB itself, third monitoring party might be the remedy. An
independent third party or the AIIB member except China can be qualified for the
monitoring party to prevent corruption and maximize openness of operations.
7.3 Problem of green environment
Although AIIB states repeatedly that its modus operandi will be lean, clean and green
with green representing its respect for the environment, many criticism still questions
the credibility of its statement of environment protection since the large scale of
infrastructure development will definitely cause environment deterioration. Concerns
about the credibility of AIIB’s sustainable lending due to the environmental issues
grow as fast as. The solutions to environmental issues are to some extent equivalent to
address the problems of unsustainable development in developing countries.
The most important way to reduce the negative consequences on environment is to
grow public awareness and social responsibility in developing countries. AIIB’s
leadership should encourage companies, especially state-owned enterprises, to engage
in more corporate social responsibility when conducting the infrastructure projects.
For example, policy incentives such as lower interest rate for loan if green material
use. The leadership could also organize conferences about green and latest technology
and environmental protection to make recipients more exposure to the best practices
of their foreign counterparts.
In spite of several challenges facing AIIB, it is still a reality that AIIB gets a big
toehold in promoting economic growth in Asian developing countries. The
newly-born AIIB should keep pace in new investment trend and take social
responsibility to well serve its perspective members and it has a long way to go.
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8. Limitation and further research
Although the thesis confirms the important role of AIIB on infrastructure-growth of
major Asian developing countries, it still has some limitations and leaves possibilities
for modification and further research. First, the thesis only provides the empirical
results of five major Asian developing countries and no detailed research for other
smaller countries, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Thailand.
Therefore, critics might arise that it’s arbitrary to conclude the positive role of AIIB
without giving the detailed research of other small countries. These critics might point
out the crowding out effect of aid, implying that the big countries will crowd out the
aid for the small countries since the fixed aid amount and lead to negative role of
AIIB on Asian developing countries as whole.
The technical problems of the ARDL model are also open to criticize. First, the
econometric model in my thesis doesn’t take into consideration the policy factors
which are emphasized in the previous aid-growth literature and might be doubted for
biased empirical results. For further improvement, CPIA can be included as a policy
index variable in my ARDL model. Also, since the Ease of doing business mentioned
in the thesis can be regarded as the contributor to the efficiency of private capital, the
inclusion of private capital and Ease of doing business index might lead to biased
estimates and the double accounting problems need to be addressed. Second, the
sample size is relatively small and probably gives wrong judgment of diagnostic tests
and biased empirical results as well. However, the first limitation is justified since the
key focus of the thesis is the sign of long-run coefficient between infrastructure and
growth and the influence of policy factors is not that big enough to change the sign of
coefficient between aid and growth. Also, some literature denies the influence of
policy factors in aid-growth relationship. The second limitation can be explained by
the unavailable data source to support the longer time period.
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The third limitation is regarding the aid allocation criteria. The thesis only points out
that it’s reasonable and suitable to take into account the infrastructure-growth
relationship when determining the proportion of aid allocation. The thesis gives a
possible measurement of the infrastructure-growth relationship in aid allocation
criteria but doesn’t provide quantitative proof for the practicality of the measurement.
No concrete implementation scheme with accurate weights in country performance
assessment are offered. The concrete implementation can be left for further research
and discussion. And the same situation happens in the second and third suggestions in
the aid allocation criteria for AIIB discussed in the Chapter 6.
Finally, the net ODA received is the measurement for the ODA in the model.
However, the major responsibility of AIIB is to provide aid to promote infrastructure
development in Asian development countries. In other words, the aid provided by
AIIB is mainly for infrastructure use. The scope of ODA discussed in the thesis to
some extent is broader than what is defined from AIIB’s perspective. In other words,
the ODA data I used in the model can capture more functions, such as poverty
alleviation and gender equity development that might result in either overestimated or
underestimated AIIB’s effects on economic growth. Specifically, if the most of aid is
used as infrastructure historically, the coefficient of infrastructure index of one
country will be underestimated, so as the effect of AIIB on its economic growth and
vice versa.
To conclude, the thesis is still open to many modifications both technically and
academically. Therefore, further research is required to address the limitations, from
which the complementary results might be derived. In spite of some limitations
existing in the thesis, the thesis still serve as a bridge between previous theoretical
research on infrastructure and aid-growth relationship and practical issue,
newly-established AIIB. At the same time, the thesis also provides a foundation for
further research for AIIB.
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9. Conclusion
To reduce the funding gap in infrastructure projects, AIIB was established in the end
of 2013 to complement ADB and well serve Asian developing countries. Primarily,
the thesis mainly discusses the newly-established Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) and its role on economic growth of Asian developing countries. In the
first part, the thesis compares AIIB with other multilateral monetary institutions, such
as World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) and discusses the functions of
AIIB to embody its irreplaceable position
In the second part, empirical analysis and econometric method are applied to find out
the potential role of AIIB in promoting economic growth in Asian developing
countries by understanding the long-run relationship between infrastructure, aid and
economic growth. The empirical results clearly show that both infrastructure and
official development aid have positive effect on economic growth in the top five
selected countries in Asia based on their demand for aid. However, the significance
level differs between countries. For China, the infrastructure development facilitates
economic growth significantly in the long run while official development aid shows
less significance in both two countries. For Malaysia and Pakistan, the case is totally
different. Infrastructure development has insignificant role in the long run. For the
other three countries, both infrastructure development and ODA are important for
economic growth. From the empirical results, we can conclude that AIIB might have
a potentially positive effect on economic growth in Asian developing countries since
at least one of the coefficients of key variables ( ODA and Infrastructure) are
significant in these five countries.
In the third part, the modification of aid allocation is suggested to distinguish AIIB
with ADB and the challenges of AIIB are pointed out with possible suggestions. The
thesis suggests that the country performance assessment which determines the country
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rating for aid should take into consideration of infrastructure-growth relationship. To
be specific, for a member country, the more related with infrastructure development
and economic growth, the more score it gets, in a result, the more possibility for more
aid. Although AIIB has a positive role in promoting economic growth in Asian
developing countries, it still face up to challenges. AIIB is criticized from its start-up
for potential corruption, bad consequences on environment and overlapping function
with ADB. The thesis also gives own suggestions for possible solutions according to
three challenges. In the final part of the thesis, the limitations of the thesis both
technically and academically are pointed out and open to further research.
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Appendix 1
The table A1.1—A1.4 show the eigenvalues and variance explained by principal
components for four countries expect China
Table A 1.1 eigenvalues and variance (India)
Source: Author’s Calculation
Table A 1.2 eigenvalues and variance (Indonesia)
Infrastructure Index for Indonesia
Principal
components
Values % of Variance Cumulative values
1 4,434421 0.7391 0.7391
2 1.112552 0.1854 0.9245
3 0.349956 0.0583 0.9828
4 0.0092360 0.0154 0.9982
5 0.009651 0.0016 0.9998
6 0.001061 0.0002 1
Source: Author’s Calculation
Infrastructure Index for India
Principal components Values % of Variance Cumulative
values
1 5.444086 0.9073 0.9073
2 0.318052 0.053 0.9604
3 0.199271 0.0332 0.9936
4 0.030466 0.0051 0.9986
5 0.005682 0.0009 0.9996
6 0.002442 0.0004 1
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Table A 1.3 Eigen values and variance (Malaysia)
Infrastructure Index for Malaysia
Principal
components
Values % of Variance Cumulative values
1 4.483165 0.7472 0.7472
2 1.006810 0.1678 0.9150
3 0.361186 0.0602 0.9752
4 0.117775 0.0196 0.9948
5 0.024855 0.0041 0.9990
6 0.006209 0.0010 1
Source: Author’s calculation
Table A 1.4 Eigen values and variance (Pakistan)
Infrastructure Index for Pakistan
Principal
components
Values % of Variance Cumulative values
1 3.789295 0.6315 0.6315
2 1.393735 0.2323 0.8638
3 0.564911 0.0942 0.9580
4 0.150003 0.0250 0.9830
5 0.085802 0.0143 0.9973
6 0.016254 0.0027 1
Source: Author’s calculation
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The table A1.5-1.8 present factor loading of original values of six indicators for four
countries.
Table A1.5 Factors loading of original values (India)
India
Infrastructure
Variables
Loadings
Air transport registered carrier departures,
world
0.41662
Electricity Power consumption( KWh per
capita)
0.425749
Fixed(wired)broadband subscriptions
(per100 people)
0.408559
Improved water source, urban(%urban
population with access)
0.399924
Mobile phone subscription (per 100
people)
0.408468
Rail Line (Total route-km) 0.389177
Table A1.6 Factors loading of original values (Indonesia)
Indonesia
Infrastructure
Variables
Loadings
Air transport registered carrier
departures, world
0.387617
Electricity Power consumption( KWh
per capita)
0.423389
Fixed(wired)broadband subscriptions
(per100 people)
0.412522
Improved water source, urban(%urban
population with access)
0.418022
Mobile phone subscription (per 100
people)
0.425651
Rail Line (Total route-km) 0.37998
Source: Author’s calculation
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Table A1.7 Factors loading of original values (Malaysia)
Malaysia
Infrastructure
Variables
Loadings
Air transport registered carrier
departures, world
0.391867
Electricity Power consumption( KWh
per capita)
0.447011
Fixed(wired)broadband subscriptions
(per100 people)
0.461244
Improved water source, urban(%urban
population with access)
0.339757
Mobile phone subscription (per 100
people)
0.456236
Rail Line (Total route-km) 0.332100
Source: Author’s calculation
Table A1.8 Factors loading of original values (Pakistan)
Pakistan
Infrastructure
Variables
Loadings
Air transport registered carrier
departures, world
0.455686
Electricity Power consumption( KWh
per capita)
0.282285
Fixed(wired)broadband subscriptions
(per100 people)
0.456687
Improved water source, urban(%urban
population with access)
0.453417
Mobile phone subscription (per 100
people)
0.430203
Rail Line (Total route-km) 0.336809
Source: Author’s calculation
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Appendix 2
As mentioned previously, double counting problem might lead to coefficient bias in
the regression because this method will provide for a larger coefficient on aid when
investment also includes ODA. In the thesis, there are two sources of capital, namely,
private and public investment. Here, the dependent variable, INV is the aggregration
of public and private investment13. Therefore, we can address the problem by
estimating the coefficient 2 through the following specified equation to exclude the
effect of ODA on the public capital.
ODAINV 21   (15)
The basic investment mechanism regression model for a specific country i can be
given as follows and tKpubtdefines the public capital which excludes the official
development aid.
titititititi LnCreditLnGDPLnODALnINVL ,,4,3,21,10,nINV   
(16)
The following table presents the regression results for five countries. From the table,
we can find that in all the five countries, official development aid affects investment
positively but not always significantly. Only in the case of China, aid affects
investment significantly. For other four countries, the coefficients are not significant
However, it is still necessary to take the investment transmission mechanism. The
following table 2.1-2.5 present the results of investment regression for the five
countries.
13 The used data here is the gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)
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Table A2.1 Results of investment regression (China)
Dependent Variable: LNINV
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNODA 18.14703 5.293614 3.428098 0.0041
LNCREDIT 0.156873 0.051232 3.062033 0.0084
LNGDP 0.860516 0.348783 2.467193 0.0271
LNKPUB(-1) 0.347430 0.167210 2.077807 0.0566
C -0.027077 0.104911 -0.258091 0.8001
R-squared 0.727623 Mean dependent var 0.437750
Adjusted R-squared 0.649801 S.D. dependent var 0.043995
S.E. of regression 0.026035 Akaike info criterion -4.237802
Sum squared resid 0.009490 Schwarz criterion -3.989266
Log likelihood 45.25912 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.195740
F-statistic 9.349825 Durbin-Watson stat 1.272222
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000678
Source: Author’s Calculation
Table A 2.2 Results of investment regression (India)
Dependent Variable: LNINV
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.015923 0.049232 0.323437 0.7511
LNCREDIT 0.074420 0.078974 0.942339 0.3620
LNODA 8.600525 7.021521 1.224881 0.2408
LNGDP 0.154229 0.222336 0.693676 0.4992
LNINV(-1) 0.243436 0.347788 0.699956 0.4954
R-squared 0.418892 Mean dependent var 0.123820
Adjusted R-squared 0.252862 S.D. dependent var 0.021772
S.E. of regression 0.018819 Akaike info criterion -4.886927
Sum squared resid 0.004958 Schwarz criterion -4.638391
Log likelihood 51.42581 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.844865
F-statistic 2.522980 Durbin-Watson stat 1.814622
Prob(F-statistic) 0.087991
Source: Author’s Calculation
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Table A2.3 Results of investment regression (Indonesia)
Dependent variables: LNINV
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -5.043478 3.409831 -1.479099 0.1613
LNINV(-1) 0.608461 0.098459 6.179856 0.0000
LNODA 0.050730 0.043784 1.158639 0.2660
LNGDP 0.488132 0.264245 1.847271 0.0859
LNCREDIT 0.040073 0.356350 0.112455 0.9121
R-squared 0.974092 Mean dependent var 25.06452
Adjusted R-squared 0.966689 S.D. dependent var 0.592903
S.E. of regression 0.108212 Akaike info criterion -1.388509
Sum squared resid 0.163939 Schwarz criterion -1.139973
Log likelihood 18.19084 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.346447
F-statistic 131.5912 Durbin-Watson stat 2.621454
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Source: Author’s Calculation
Table A2.4 Results of investment regression (Malaysia)
Dependent Variable: LNINV
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.041698 0.047586 -0.876280 0.3957
LNINV(-1) 0.703328 0.141589 4.967395 0.0002
LNODA 3.054768 7.377350 0.414074 0.6851
LNGDP -0.179105 0.133794 -1.338667 0.2020
LNCREDIT 0.064194 0.034695 1.850248 0.0855
R-squared 0.746038 Mean dependent var 0.127197
Adjusted R-squared 0.673477 S.D. dependent var 0.038053
S.E. of regression 0.021744 Akaike info criterion -4.598000
Sum squared resid 0.006619 Schwarz criterion -4.349463
Log likelihood 48.68100 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.555937
F-statistic 10.28157 Durbin-Watson stat 2.316661
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000424
Source: Author’s Calculation
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Table A2.5 Results of investment regression (Pakistan)
Dependent variable: LNINV
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.116235 0.056067 -2.073135 0.0571
LNINV (-1) 0.772155 0.093476 8.260452 0.0000
LNGDPG 0.018543 0.260753 0.071114 0.9443
LNCREDIT 0.268576 0.110621 2.427895 0.0293
LNODA 0.568823 0.898698 0.632941 0.5370
R-squared 0.926354 Mean dependent var 0.114458
Adjusted R-squared 0.905312 S.D. dependent var 0.064905
S.E. of regression 0.019972 Akaike info criterion -4.768011
Sum squared resid 0.005584 Schwarz criterion -4.519474
Log likelihood 50.29610 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.725949
F-statistic 44.02436 Durbin-Watson stat 3.390097
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Source: Author’s Calculation
